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PRECAP; Letica Land Company, LLC v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County: A Modest Property Dispute  
Brian Geer 
No. DA 14-0780 
Montana Supreme Court 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, September 16th, 2015, at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, located in the Joseph P. 
Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, Montana. 
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Did the district court err in determining that the “lower branch” 
of Modesty Creek Road was a petitioned county road? 
Did it also correctly determine that a prescriptive easement 
existed for the “upper branch” of the road? 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The land relevant to this case involves the area surrounding 
Modesty Creek, located approximately 10 miles north of Anaconda, 
between Deer Lodge Valley and National Forest Land. The contested 
roads, the upper and lower branch of Modesty Creek, cross through the 
property of Appellants Letica Land Company, LLC (“Letica”) and Don 
McGee, as well as the property of a non-party, Joe Launderville. (See 
Fig. 1).  
 
 
126 MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE Vol. 76 
  
Figure 1: Map of the Modesty Creek roads and neighboring property. 
(Appellee’s Ans. Br. 7, June 1, 2015). Though the key says that the lower 
branch is "undisputed," it should say that is where the district court 
determined the road ended, since Letica does dispute the road's 
terminus. (See Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 42–43). 
The Modesty Creek roads were first used in the 1860s for mining 
activities and have a complicated history of use and ownership.1 In early 
2012, after a complaint that the landowners were blocking an allegedly 
public road, Appellee Anaconda-Deer Lodge County (“the County”) 
hired local attorney Susan Callaghan to research the legal status of the 
road. Ms. Callaghan found that the lower branch of Modesty Creek Road 
was created in 1889 by the “Nelson petition,” and the upper branch was 
created in 1902 by the “Scott Petition.”2 She reported that the lower 
branch ran west through McGee, Letica, and Launderville’s property, 
respectively, while the upper branch traversed Launderville’s property 
and ended in the Beaverhead-Deer Lodge National Forest.3 The Modesty 
Creek area became National Forest Land in 1905, and was later given to 
the Anaconda Mining Company by a federal land patent in 1937.4 After 
the Anaconda Mining Company sold the land in 1965, the land passed 
through several owners until it was finally purchased by Ilija Letica in 
1989.5 Appellant McGee purchased the adjacent land in 1997.6 
Notably, at some time in the early 1980s, the owner locked the 
access gates to the lower branch, posted “No Trespassing” signs, and put 
notices in the local newspapers stating the roads were no longer open to 
the public.7 Additionally, appellants stated the roads were “unused, 
inaccessible, obviously overgrown, and filled with deadfall” when they 
inspected and bought their property.8 
On March 7, 2012, after a vote by the Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County Commissioners to reaffirm the two roads as petitioned county 
roads, the County cut the locks off two private gates blocking the public 
roads.9 Shortly afterward, Letica filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief 
and for a preliminary injunction against the County, which was denied by 
the district court in July of 2012.10 Letica later filed an amended 
complaint, which added McGee as a plaintiff and also added 
constitutional and tort claims against the County.11 
                                           
1 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 2, June 1, 2015, No. DA 14-0780. 
2 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 5, Apr. 7, 2015, No. DA 14-0780. 
3 Id. at 9. 
4 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 9. 
5 Id. at 9. 
6 Id. 
7 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 10. 
8 Id. at 11 (internal quotations omitted). 
9 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 3. 
10 Id. 
11 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 6. 
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At a week-long bench trial, the district court addressed only the 
legal status of the Modesty Creek roads pursuant to a stipulation which 
bifurcated Letica’s constitutional and tort claims.12 On October 6, 2014, 
it issued a 74-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
which concluded that the lower branch was a publicly-petitioned road 
and that a public prescriptive easement existed on the upper branch.13    
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants argue the district court incorrectly ruled on each 
issue. First, the appellants state that the court misinterpreted the “record 
taken as a whole” and ignored inconsistencies in the record, such as an 
unfulfilled condition precedent in the 1889 petition, records outside the 
county records, and the use of County-created maps which did not 
clearly indicate where the road ended.14 Secondly, with respect to the 
upper branch, the appellants contest that the court could not have found a 
prescriptive easement because of the lack of adverse use of the land or 
use otherwise sufficient to establish an easement.15 Alternatively, they 
argue that any such easement would have been eliminated by reverse 
prescription because the landowners had locked the gates for over 30 
years.16 Letica also contests the district court’s bifurcation of the 
constitutional and tort claims against the County. 
A. Interpreting the Record as a Whole 
When determining whether a public road was created by statute, 
the court must analyze whether the “record taken as a whole” shows the 
county road was created.17 Both Letica and McGee focused a significant 
portion of their briefs on analyzing the 1889 Nelson Petition, which 
defined the lower branch as a public highway.18 They argue the court 
simply ignored a conditional declaration in the petition which required 
the county to exert interest in the road.19 The minutes from the 1889 
meeting state that the lower branch “is hereby declared a public highway 
with the provision that all parties interested in or benefitted by said road 
bear all expenses conducted with opening and building the same.”20 In 
order to claim jurisdiction over the road, the appellants contest that the 
                                           
12 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 4. 
13 Id. After discovery closed, the County found a document wedged behind a shelf which 
contradicted the Scott petition. The County therefore admitted the upper branch was not a petitioned 
road, but still contested that an easement existed. Id. at 4. 
14 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 30–31; Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 8, Apr. 1, 2015, No. DA 
14-0780. 
15 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 32; Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 8.  
16 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 53. 
17 Reid v. Park County, 627 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1981). 
18 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 34–42; Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 8–16. 
19 Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 8. 
20 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 34. 
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County needed to assert some control over the road, either by financial 
support or by maintaining the road.21 Letica states that the County 
“conducted a trivial amount of maintenance on the lower branch between 
1956 and 1965,” which was only at the request of landowners and ceased 
entirely after 1965.22 Appellants claim that the court “shrugged off” the 
County’s failure to provide evidence supporting compliance with this 
provision.23 
Additionally, Letica argues that the court overlooked evidence 
that the County did not recognize the road for over a century, referencing 
the fact that neither the 1913 county map nor any county map after 1896 
ever acknowledged the existence of this road.24  
1. Analysis 
While the County provides a copious amount of evidence to 
support “the record as a whole,” the Court will have to determine 
whether or not it appropriately addressed the language of the conditional 
declaration. The relevant statute provides “the county shall refuse 
establish the [road] as a public highway, unless the expenses and 
damages . . . shall be paid in advance by the petitioners.”25 The County 
does not directly address the appellants’ argument, rather, it simply says 
the statute has “no bearing” and that “Modesty Creek Road was 
unconditionally declared a public highway on June 3, 1889.”26 It then 
moves on to say that because the road was already built, “no damages 
were owed to private landowners and it is doubtful whether any expenses 
of opening and building the road were necessary.”27 Finally, the County 
relies heavily on Powell County v. 5 Rockin’ MS Angus Ranch, 102 P.3d 
1210 (2004), which coincidentally held that the same June 3, 1889 
meeting created a different road with the same conditional declaration 
and statutory requirement.28 Letica points out, however, 5 Rockin’ MS is 
readily distinguishable because the parties in 5 Rockin’ MS explicitly 
agreed that the road was a county road.29 The County seems to rely on 
the amount of evidence and testimony it provided to the district court 
rather than directly addressing the appellants’ contentions. The Court 
will have to sort through the relevant evidence to determine the 
applicability of the statute before addressing any other issues regarding 
the lower branch. 
                                           
21 Id. at 35. 
22 Id. at 36–37. 
23 Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 10. 
24 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 36. 
25 Id. at 34 (quoting Comp. Stat. of Mont.—General Laws § 1819 (1887)). 
26 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 22. 
27 Id. at 23.  
28 Id. 
29 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 35.  
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As to the appellants’ second argument regarding the County’s 
alleged non-recognition of the road after 1913, the Court would likely 
disfavor this argument because the inconsistencies on a map can be 
explained. While it is potentially troubling that a marked county road 
would not exist on a map, it is too great a leap to say, as Letica does, that 
a map from 1913 depicts “all known roads” when the map does not show 
the entire county and has large areas left blank because they not yet been 
surveyed.30 Additionally, at trial, the appellants’ expert witness “agreed 
that just because a road is not on a map doesn’t mean that there is no 
county road in that location.”31 
B. The End of Modesty Creek Road 
The district court determined a county road existed on the lower 
branch and that it ended in the eastern portion of Section 22, in National 
Forest Land.32 In its brief, Letica contested that the map the district court 
used to determine the location of the road did not show the road 
extending into Section 22, but that it actually ended on the eastern edge 
of Section 23 at “Dry Gulch.”33 Letica states the district had to rely on 
“hearsay-riddled mining evidence” in order to determine that the road 
ended over a mile beyond where it believes the road ends.34 
1. Analysis 
While the Court probably will not dwell on this issue, it is 
important to note why Letica makes this argument. If the lower branch 
were to end on the eastern border of Section 23 at Dry Gulch, then it 
would not reach the alleged prescriptive easement on the upper branch, 
which would affect the judgment as to the upper branches prescriptive 
easement.35  
Letica’s evidence, however, relies mainly on expert testimony 
which the court rejected as unpersuasive. As the trier of fact, the district 
court dismissed this argument because, after conducting a site view and 
reviewing mining evidence and other testimony, it found Appellant’s 
expert witness’s conclusions to be “inappropriate . . . post hoc 
rationalizations.”36 It is unlikely the Court will address this in much 
detail. 
 
C. Public Prescriptive Easement on the Upper Branch 
                                           
30 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 26 (quoting Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 17).  
31 Id. at 25–26 (citing FOF ¶ 58) (internal quotations omitted). 
32 Order 5, Oct. 6, 2014, No. DV-12-24. 
33 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 14. 
34 Id. at 42.  
35 Appellant Letica’s Reply Br. 18, June 22, 2015, No. DA 14-0780. 
36 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 36 (citations omitted). 
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Letica and McGee argue that there was no prescriptive easement 
on the upper branch because the use was either not adverse or the 
adverse parties’ control was insufficient to create a prescriptive 
easement.37 Additionally, appellants argue that the burden for proving the 
existence of an easement lies with the party seeking the easement, and 
that the County in this case did not prove the elements by the clear and 
convincing standard.38  
From 1905 to 1937, the land was part of the National Forest 
system, and easements cannot be granted over federal land.39 From the 
time the Anaconda Mining Company owned the land, from 1937 to 
1965, the district court found in its Findings of Fact that “the public 
generally knew that they were free to use Anaconda Company 
property.”40 Appellants emphasize Montana case law which holds 
permissive use is not adverse.41 The district court, however, found that 
adversity did exist “by saying that general, public knowledge . . . is 
insufficient to establish permissive use,” which the appellants argue is 
unsupported by case law.42   
Secondly, the appellants argue that the only use of the upper 
branch was either private, seasonal, or otherwise insufficient to meet the 
elements of a prescriptive easement.43 The only uses of the upper branch 
were: 1) seasonal hunting or fishing and 2) private access to water rights, 
neither of which satisfy the elements of an easement.44 Additionally, the 
Supreme Court has held that limited maintenance outside of official 
public duty (e.g. done in coordination with the landowners) is not enough 
to establish an easement.45  
1. Analysis 
This issue is a microcosm of the battle between landowners’ 
rights to their property versus the public policy of efficient use of land. 
The County’s argument would compel landowners to actively prevent 
others from using their property to avoid an easement, while the 
appellants’ argument would make it harder for the public to obtain an 
easement. The district court found a prescriptive easement was 
established between 1953 and 1980.46 The County claims the burden then 
shifted to the landowners to prove the use was not adverse once the 
                                           
37 Id. at 42. 
38 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 45. 
39 Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 17 (citing Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc., 313 
P.3d 182, 186 (2013)). 
40 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 47.  
41 Id. (citing, e.g. Pedersen v. Ziehl, 311 P.3d 765, 768–69 (2013)). 
42 Id. at 17–18. 
43 Id. at 51–52. 
44 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 52 (See PLAA v. Madison County, 321 P.3d 38, 46 (2014); Leisz v. 
Avista, 174 P.3d 481, 489 (2007); Kessinger v. Matulevich, 925 P.2d 864, 869 (1996)). 
45 Id. at 51 (citing Leffingwell Ranch v. Cieri, 916 P.2d 751, 755–56 (1996)). 
46 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 42. 
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district court had heard multiple witnesses testifying as to the adverse use 
of the land.47 The County also frames the use as “passive acquiescence” 
rather than “neighborly accommodation,” which puts the onus on the 
landowner to actively forbid the use or else the court will assume 
adversity.48 The Court will likely hear arguments to this issue because of 
the district court’s holding that general knowledge is insufficient to 
dispute adverse use. It may ultimately decide for policy reasons that 
general awareness of public use is permissive so as to not require the 
landowner to actively campaign against public use.  
D. Reverse Prescription of an Easement 
In the alternative, appellants also claimed if any prescriptive 
easement did exist, it would have been eliminated by reverse prescription 
because the parties took action to discourage public use, including 
installing a locked gate.49 “[I]f a prescriptive easement exists, subsequent 
acts inconsistent with the claim by prescription can extinguish the 
easement.”50 Notably, the district court at one point agreed with 
appellants.51 In its earlier decision not to grant a preliminary injunction in 
July 2012, the district court stated that if there was a public easement, it 
would likely have been lost through reverse prescription.52 After 
determining the lower branch was a statutorily created road, however, the 
district court held that because the appellants illegally blocked off the 
upper branch by installing a gate on the lower branch, allowing reverse 
prescription would defy public policy.53 In sum, the appellants argue that 
where the gate is placed is irrelevant; prohibiting public use for the 
statutory period of five years is enough in itself to extinguish a 
prescriptive easement. 
1. Analysis 
If the Court does affirm a prescriptive easement did exist on the 
upper branch, it will have to resolve the policy argument of reverse 
prescription. The County, for the most part, does not contest that the 
elements were not met, but rather that it is against public policy to allow 
reverse prescription by illegally blocking roads.54 Appellants argue that it 
is enough that there were five years of non-use by the public, regardless 
of where the gates were locked.55 It is more likely, however, that if the 
                                           
47 Id. at 43. 
48 Id. at 44. 
49 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 53–54; Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 18. 
50 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 54 (quoting Dome Mountain Ranch v. Park County, 37 P.3d 710, 
714 (2001) (internal quotations omitted)). 
51 Appellant McGee’s Opening Br. 18. 
52 Id. 
53 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 54. 
54 Id.  
55 Appellant Letica’s Opening Br. 57. 
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Court gets this far in the analysis it will again uphold the district court’s 
judgment. If the lower branch is upheld to be a legal public road, the 
Court will probably affirm that illegally blocking access to an easement 
is against public policy.  
E. Bifurcation of Letica’s Constitutional and Tort Claims 
Letica’s objection to the court’s sua sponte bifurcation of the claims in 
its July 2013 order meets considerable resistance and will not likely be 
addressed by the Court. The County points out that the parties had 
entered into a Stipulation to Bifurcate Liability and Damages Claims 
until there was a final decision on the status of the roads.56  The parties 
agreed that there would be “no reason to consider the other claims or 
damages at trial” until the parties knew the court’s determination of the 
pending issue.57 Additionally, the County argues that not only did Letica 
consent to the bifurcation, but they also did not present evidence at trial 
regarding these claims and they are therefore untimely and not 
reviewable.58   
 
 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Letica Land Company, LLC: Martin S. King, 
Jesse Kodadek, Worden Thane P.C., Missoula, MT. 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Don McGee: Mark L. Stermitz, Jeffrey Kuchel, 
Crowley Fleck PLLP, Missoula, MT. 
Attorneys for Respondent, Anaconda-Deer Lodge County: Cynthia 
Walker, Mark Thieszen, Poore, Roth & Robinson, Butte, MT.  
                                           
56 Appellee’s Ans. Br. 57–58. 
57 Id. at 58. 
58 Id. at 59. 
